Control Yuan President Chen Chu's Choice
By Hsia Chen
The Storm Media, September 22, 2023
Once again, President Chen Chu of the Control Yuan came under the media spotlight. However, her media attention during the egg import controversy lasted only 24 hours. After the Control Yuan issued a strong clarification, it quickly dissipated. In contrast to the Minister of Agriculture Chen Chi-Chung, who resigned over the egg scandal, the question remains: Did Chen Chu, as head of the Control Yuan, intervene in the National Audit Office’s (NAO) authority? It may seem like a “minor matter,” but because the Control Yuan’s press release emphasized the “constitutional authority” of the NAO, it is worth discussing, especially considering Chen Chu still has three years left in office. Chen Chu’s so-called “minor matter” has unavoidably become a “constitutional matter” for Taiwan’s democracy.
The Control Yuan issued news cautiously, originating from the NAO’s audit review a month ago, which pointed out numerous budget irregularities in the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen, such as disregarding fiscal discipline, raising concerns in various circles. During a Control Yuan plenary meeting, Chen suggested that if there were differing interpretations of the NAO report, it should consider appointing a spokesperson to make clarifications. At the same time, the Control Yuan organized a “consensus meeting” that invited the NAO heads to participate. This move was interpreted as the Control Yuan’s attempt to exert pressure. The Control Yuan clarified that there was no such thing as an intervention of the NAO because the audit report falls under the “constitutional authority of the Control Yuan” and should naturally be sent to the Control Yuan for “review.” So where is the concern about intervention coming from?
Chen’s understanding may not be wrong because the audit report is not solely at the discretion of the NAO. This report should be sent to the Control Yuan for “review,” and to the Legislative Yuan, and when necessary, the minister of the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics must also attend a “special report” at the Legislative Yuan.
Chen’s mistake lies in her mislinkage with the “supervisory authority." This has been the primary reason she was seen as an inappropriate choice from the outset when she was nominated as the president of the Control Yuan. Her strong party affiliation and staunch support for the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration have led to her request for the NAO to appoint a spokesperson “for clarification.” Ironically, the object of correction in the NAO’s report is the DPP administration, but is the NAO wrong?
According to the Auditing Act, auditing powers include supervising budget execution, approving revenue and expenditure orders, auditing final accounts, inspecting financial or physical misconduct or misconduct in the performance of duties, assessing financial efficiency, approving financial responsibilities, and other auditing matters empowered by law. In simple terms, if the government’s budget and execution are normal, there is no need for the audit department’s involvement. The NAO identifies issues in minor matters and pinpoints errors in major matters. It even submits them to the Control Yuan as a basis for censure. If the Tsai administration follows fiscal discipline, documents would simply be archived after NAO’s review. However, if a government agency's budget allocation or execution has problems, Control Yuan members can use the audit report to rectify the agency's behavior and warn against repeating past mistakes in the coming year.
This is the essence of an independent supervisory authority separate from the executive branch. It’s not a protectorate; whether it is considered a part of the “parliament” or not, its position should align with the public interest rather than that of the executive branch. The Legislative Yuan’s constitutional authority is to balance the power of the executive branch, not to protect it. However, the constitutional authority of the Legislative Yuan is constrained in various ways – it can reduce the budget a little but not increase it, discuss bills a bit more or prevent bills from being passed easily, engage in some checks and balances against major policies of the Executive Yuan, or criticize the government’s performance until an administrative head apologizes or resigns. The Control Yuan’s powers, on the other hand, would be greater than the Legislative Yuan’s. It can rectify agencies and even impeach personnel. Impeaching personnel is not a trivial matter, it can lead to disciplinary court proceedings, ranging from warning to the cancellation of retirement benefits for the accused. In serious cases, it can be referred to the judicial authorities for further investigation, ensuring that wrongdoers cannot go unpunished.
Unfortunately, Chen’s love for President Tsai goes beyond the Control Yuan’s constitutional authority. As a result, the Control Yuan under her leadership has been excessively cautious, with only a few impeachment cases and occasional corrections. Instead, it is filled with investigative reports. But do government agencies even take the Control Yuan’s investigation seriously?
As another example, during the egg scandal, from missing eggs to suspicions of profiteering from imported eggs, unclear expiration date labeling, and even claims by companies that they changed the origin labeling on “central government orders,” every single aspect of it is suffice to depose officials. However, when Kuomintang (KMT) legislators petitioned the Control Yuan, no member dared to take the case. Information on the flow of imported eggs, which local governments could not retrieve, should be investigated by the Control Yuan. If the Control Yuan is committed to its constitutional authority and safeguards the interests of the people, then who would suspect the Tsai administration’s involvement in this profiteering scandal?
What is even more laughable and lamentable is that during the peak of the egg scandal, the Control Yuan meeting chaired by Chen did not discuss the egg issue, instead, it called for the NAO to appoint a spokesperson. With an audit report being open and transparent, why the need for a spokesperson? Is it so difficult to investigate the egg scandal? The spiraling egg price and shortage of eggs did not happen overnight. How can the Control Yuan just sit idly by?
The president of the Control Yuan can conduct an investigation independently, but he or she cannot guide or give instructions to other members of the Control Yuan. Control Yuan members can have differing opinions on auditing reports of the NAO but they have no right to give guidance or instructions. More importantly, the head of the NAO was nominated by the president and approved by the Legislative Yuan, unlike the cabinet ministers who were appointed by the premier. The nature of its independence is clear judging from its nomination process. What the president of the Control Yuan should do is be detached and independent from the political party so that the public can trust the credibility of the Control Yuan to independently exercise its power. Unfortunately, Chen has been in office for more than three years and has shown an evident inclination towards favoring the DPP. She has not yet learned how to be an independent and competent president of the Control Yuan. What’s worrying is the fact that three years remain until her term ends.